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I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2003, Guaranteed Returns Diversified Inc.
(Guaranteed), a new player in the investment market with substantial
backing, launched its website to attract investors to its newest hedge
fund product.' Guaranteed described itself as "the world's leading
operator of hedge funds. Based in the Wylshock Islands in the Indian
Ocean, with 68 offices world-wide, [Guaranteed had] been making
money for sophisticated investors for more than 18 years."2 The
incredible funds advertised on Guaranteed's website included "York
Partner's L.P.," which claimed to have generated returns of 148% since
2000, or "Paragon Financial, L.P.," which had consistently offered
returns of up to ninety-nine percent.3 Unfortunately, Guaranteed is too
good to be true. The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
created Guaranteed (Symbol GRDI, pronounced "Greedy") as a
cautionary reminder to overzealous investors with more money than
financial savvy.4 Despite the outrageous claims by Guaranteed, the site
received over 80,000 hits in a ten month period.5
Guaranteed illustrates the growth in popularity of the hedge
fund industry that has raised concern within the SEC.6 As hedge funds
have become more popular with affluent investors and have been
marketed to smaller investors through "funds of hedge funds,"7 the SEC
has taken action to insure against fraud. On December 10, 2004, the
1. Guaranteed Returns Diversified, Inc. at http://www.growthventure.congrdi (last
visited Jan. 21, 2005).
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. Neil Weinberg, Fees on Fees, FORBES, Dec. 8, 2003, at 186.
5. Id.
6. See Erik J. Greupner, Hedge Funds are Headed Down-Market: A call for Increased
Regulation?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1555, 1570-73 (2003) (citing several actions taken by
the SEC against unregistered hedge fund advisors such as Peter Chabot, Michael Smirlock,
David Mobley, Mark Yagalla, and Michael Berger).
7. See infra notes 148-57 and accompanying text.
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SEC released final rules to amend the Investment Advisors Act of 1940
to include certain hedge fund advisors.8 There has been heated debate
over whether the final rule will be effective in protecting investors or
even if there is a threat to investors in the first place. 9
SEC regulation of the hedge fund industry is long overdue.
Today, as they have throughout their existence, hedge funds have free
reign over the world of investments.' ° Hedge funds, though effective in
many cases, are rife with incentives for misconduct." Unfortunately,
the SEC's proposed ruling is inadequate in meeting even its own stated
goals.' 2 This paper will describe the hedge fund industry, 3 explain the
reasons why hedge fund regulation is necessary, 14 and analyze the
strengths and weaknesses of the final rule with respect to these
concerns.1
5
Part II will explain how hedge funds work.16 Part III will give a
brief history of the hedge fund industry and examine its recent trends.'
7
Part IV will discuss the existing regulations imposed on hedge funds.
8
Part V will look at the causes for concern that inspired the SEC to take
action.' 9 Part VI will examine the structure of the final rule and
comment on how it differs from previous regulations on the industry. 20
Part VII will examine the industry reaction to the final rule and examine
the strengths and weaknesses of the rule.2' Finally, Part VIII will
conclude by discussing why the rule will be ineffective.22
8. Registration Under the Advisors Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisors, 69 Fed. Reg.
72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279) [hereinafter Final Rule].
9. See infra notes 110-257 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
11. See generally Robert Lenzner & Michael Maiello, The Money Vanishes, FORBES,
Aug. 6, 2001, at 70.
12. See infra notes 211-51 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 23-105 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 110-64 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 165-257 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 23-41 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 57-105 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 106-64 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 165-2 10 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 211-57 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 258-66 and accompanying text.
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II. WHAT IS A HEDGE FUND?
Hedge funds are the mysterious rich uncle of the investment
industry family; no one agrees on his age, occupation or history, but
everyone knows that he is related.23 Authorities differ as to the
definition of "hedge fund. 24 Although there is no legal definition, three
elements are generally included in the description of a hedge fund: high
leverage,5 elite investors,2 6 and little SEC oversight.27  Hedge funds
have traditionally been highly leveraged small investment companies
with an investment model pitting long positions2 8 against short ones 29 in
23. See David A. Vaughan, Comments of Dechert at U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission Roundtable on Hedge Funds, available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight
/hedgefunds/hedge-vaughn.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2005) (describing a variety of hedge
fund definitions from several authorities, including George Soros, William H. Donaldson,
The Secretary of the Treasury, and the Securities and Exchange Commission). Though the
definition of hedge fund tend to have several similar characteristics, there is general
agreement that the lack of regulation of hedge funds causes regulators and investors alike to
know very little about hedge funds, including how many exist and who runs them. Hedge
Fund Activities in the U.S. Financial Markets: Testimony of Richard R. Lindsey Before the
House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 10 5th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Richard
R. Lindsey, Director, SEC Division of Market Regulation) available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testarchivel1998/tsty1498.htm (last visited Feb. 12,
2005).
24. See id.
25. See LISA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICE ACTIVITIES 585 (2d ed. 2004). Leverage refers to the ratio between a corporation's
debt and its equity capital. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 926 (8th ed. 2004).
26. See Russ Wiles, One Way the Rich Get Richer - Hedge Funds a Risk not all can
Take, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Mar. 18, 2002, at ID. Generally, hedge fund investment has only
been open to rich, experienced investors, who can afford the sometimes great risk of hedge
funds. Id.
27. See infra notes 57-105 and accompanying text. The final rule would require hedge
fund advisors to register with the SEC under the Advisors Act of 1933. See infra, notes 165-
210 and accompanying text. This would place a variety of reporting and accounting
requirements on hedge funds, but it would not totally dissolve the freedom from regulation
that hedge funds enjoy. Id.
28. See Investorguide.com, University, at http://www.investorguide.com/igustock
strategy.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2005). A "Long" position is simply the purchase of a
security, with the hope of profiting from the increased value of the security over time. Id.
29. See Investorguide.com, University, available at http://www.investorguide.com/
igustockshort.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2005). "Selling short" is when an investor borrows
stock from a stockholder with the promise to replace it at a later date. Id. The borrowed
stock is sold on the open market, and the profits from the sale are kept by borrower. Id.
Hopefully, by the time the borrowed stock is due for return, the value of the stock has gone
down and can be bought on the open market for a lower price. Id. Thus the investor can
profit by replacing the borrowed stock by buying it at a lower price than borrowed. Id. For
example, if investor A believes that Acme stock is overpriced, it could borrow shares of that
stock from a current stockholder with the promise to replace them at a future date. Id.
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order to reduce vulnerability to market fluctuations. 30  Not all hedge
funds follow such a sophisticated arbitrage model, however, and many
do not "hedge" investments at all.31
Hedge funds have traditionally been available only to wealthy
investors through private issuances of stock.32 Each fund carries a
relatively small number of investors, either 100 or 499, depending on
the securities laws utilized during initial setup.33 Generally, hedge
funds are set up as private limited partnerships or limited liability
companies which qualify for pass-through taxation.34 The investment
strategies are generally kept private, and they may span across a diverse
array of investment products. Usually, one fund manager makes
Investor A would immediately sell those shares to buyer B, who is interested in buying
stock in Acme. See Investorguide.com, University, available at http://www.
investorguide.com/igustockshort.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2005). Investor A keeps the
money received from the sale of the borrowed shares. Id. If investor A's prediction is
correct, and the price of Acme stock falls, the investor can purchase the stock it owes to the
lending party using the money it received from the sale of the initial stock. Id. Thus,
investor A can profit on the difference between the price of the stock when it was borrowed,
and the price of the stock when it must be replenished, minus the fee incurred by borrowing
the stock and brokerage fees. Id.
30. See ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM
CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 25 (2000). Hedge funds were originally designed as a conservative
investment model, pitting long term investments against short selling to insulate the total
investment portfolio from market fluctuations. Id.
31. See Testimony Concerning Investor Protection Implications of Hedge Funds Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of
William H. Donaldson, SEC Chairman) [hereinafter Donaldson], at http:/l
www.sec.gov/news/testimony/0410035whd.htm. Hedge funds can employ any variety of
investment strategies, including high or low risk, diversified or singular, and still be
declared hedge funds. Id.
32. See Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 681,
684 (2001).
33. See Greupner, supra note 6, at 1561-62. Before 1996, most hedge funds exempted
themselves from the Investment Company Act of 1940 under section 3(c)(1). Id. The
exception allows hedge funds to sell shares to no more than 100 investors. Id. In 1996,
however, the SEC passed the National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA),
which amended the Investment Company Act of 1940 to include an exception to the
definition of "investment company" under section 3(c)(7) for private investment funds that
sell exclusive securities offerings to "qualified purchasers." Id. Under the exception, hedge
funds were allowed to sell shares to a maximum of 499 investors, who must have a higher
net worth in order to achieve "qualified investor" status. Id.
34. See Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital
Management, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 190 (1999) (noting that hedge funds can be organized
as limited liability companies, but most are limited liability partnerships). Many hedge funds
are offshore funds organized in countries which have lenient regulatory controls of
investment transactions and provide tax advantages for hedge fund investing. Id. at 191.
35. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 30, at 24.
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investment decisions 36 and receives compensation through upfront
management fees, commissions based on fund profitability, or a
combination of both.37
Exemption from registration with the SEC allows hedge funds
to utilize investment styles that are off limits to other investment
entities, such as mutual funds. 38 Though some hedge funds are required
to register with the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, 39 and
others voluntarily register with the SEC,40 hedge funds generally
operate outside the scope of SEC regulation or oversight.41
III. HEDGE FUNDS OF YESTERDAY AND TODAY
The first hedge fund was run by an Australian investor named
Alfred Winslow Jones.42 Jones balanced his portfolio by selling short
stocks that were overpriced and buying stocks that were a bargain.4 3 By
setting up his portfolio to profit if the market declined or grew, Jones
was able to insulate against market fluctuation. 44 The strategy was
dependent only upon finding the "relative best and worst., 45  From
Jones' original framework, hedge funds have grown to encompass all
areas of the market.46
36. See Gibson, supra note 32, at 684.
37. See Donaldson, supra note 31. (noting that hedge fund advisors are compensated
through management fees and performance fees).
38. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 28, at 24. Hedge funds may concentrate their
portfolios without any regard for diversification. ld; see generally supra notes 57-102 and
accompanying text. Hedge funds are subject to only a few provisions of the four major
securities acts, such as the anti-fraud provisions of the Advisors Act of 1940. See supra note
96 and accompanying text. Hedge funds are not directly regulated by any of the four major
securities laws, but only because they have molded themselves around the law to fit within
specific exemptions. See supra notes 55-99 and accompanying text. Thus, the true force to
securities laws on hedge funds is the effect they have on shaping the industry through the
exceptions rather than direct statutory control or oversight. See supra notes 55-99 and
accompanying text.
39. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 30, at 24.
40. See Chris Frankie, Registered Hedge Fund Demand on the Rise, INVESTMENT
MGMT. WKLY, Sept. 6, 2004.
41. Id.




46. See Gibson, supra note 32, at 684. Hedge funds still pursue conservative models of
investing such as those pioneered by Jones, but they have grown to encompass all areas of
the market, including debt and equity securities, futures, options, over the counter
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Hedge funds have not only evolved into different investment
models but have expanded in terms of numbers and assets as well.47 In
1968, it is estimated there were only 215 hedge funds.48 By 2001, that
number had grown to 6,000.4 9 By 2003, it is thought that between 6,000
and 7,000 hedge funds were in operation with over $650 billion in
assets under management. ° Some estimates believe that hedge fund
holdings will soon eclipse the one trillion dollar mark.5' This rapid
growth52 has been caused by a number of factors, including changes to
federal law increasing the maximum number of investors in a hedge
fund,53 the growth in qualified investors who are able to meet the
minimum investment requirements for hedge funds,54 the growth of new
vehicles for investing in hedge funds such as "funds of hedge funds, 5
and the underlying mystique surrounding hedge funds as a risk-free way
to maximize investment returns.56
derivatives, and foreign currencies. See Lindsey supra note 23. Hedge funds have grown to
the point where they can now be found in nearly any variety. Id. They trade in equities, US
and foreign government securities, commodities, financial futures, options, foreign
currencies, derivatives, and merger and acquisition investments. LOWENSTEIN, supra note
30, at 25. Hedge funds are present in all areas of the market. Id.
47. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 30, at 26.
48. Id.
49. See Greupner, supra note 6, at 1561.
50. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF
HEDGE FUNDS vii (Staff ed. 2003) [hereinafter Staff Report].
51. See id; see also Donaldson, supra note 31.
52. See Phillip Morton, Hedge Fund Inflows Double in Third Quarter, at
http://www.investorsoffshore.com/asp/story/storyinv.asp?storyname= 17770 (Oct. 29, 2004).
Hedge funds total inflow is estimated at 17 billion from August of 2004 to October of the
same year. Id. This represents twice the capital as the previous quarter. Id.
53. See Greupner, supra note 6, at 1561. Under the change to the Investment Company
Act of 1940 enacted under the NSMIA, individual hedge funds could take on as many as
five times as many clients than before NSMIA was enacted (up to 499). Id. Even though the
minimum net worth per investor requirement was increased under NSMIA to five million
dollars, the change increased the popularity of hedge funds as it became more alluring for
financial managers to enter the hedge fund industry. Id.
54. See MERRILL LYNCH/CAP GEMINI ERNST & YOUNG, WORLD WEALTH REP. 2002 7
(2002).
55. See Jane Bryant Quinn & Temma Ehrenfeld, The Street's Latest Lure: Some One Is
Going to Mint Money with the New Hedge Funds for Smaller Investors, NEWSWEEK, May
26, 2003, at 62.
56. See LOWENSTEIN supra note 30, at 26. As investors have called for hedge funds to
invest in, large finanicial institutions such as Merrill Lynch have worked hard to provide
them. Analisa Nazareno, Hedge Funds Remain Shrouded As more investors become
interested, the chances of greater transparency and regulation grow. But will the industry
balk at changing?, SAN-ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Sept. 6, 2003 at http://www.mccombs.
utexas.edu/news/mentions/arts/2003/09.06.sae-goodrich.asp (citing industry demand that
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IV. EXISTING REGULATIONS
Through a variety of means, the SEC and other regulatory
agencies indirectly exercise authority over the hedge fund industry.
Built in exemptions to the pertinent securities laws allow hedge funds to
operate without SEC oversight.5 8 The exemptions 5
9 have been effective
in shaping the size, marketing, and customer base of the industry, but no
set of rules has served to effectively monitor hedge funds.
6°
Hedge funds are potentially subject to SEC regulation through
four different statutes: the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act),
61 the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),
6 2 the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940 (Advisors Act),63 and the Investment Company
Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act). 64 All four of the statutes
require registration with the SEC in some form.
65 In order to avoid
registration, hedge funds must shape themselves around the exceptions
to the rules of each act.66
A. Securities Act of 1933
Under the Securities Act of 1933, any entity that wishes to offer
public securities must file a registration statement with the SEC,
67 and
may offer a prospectus about the issuer and the securities being
offered.68 Hedge funds exempt themselves from this requirement by
utilizing the "private placement exemption" in section (4)(2) of the
has spurred the growth of the hedge fund industry).
57. See Gibson, supra note 32, at 688.
58. See Donaldson, supra note 31. Hedge funds are able to avoid SEC regulation by
meeting a set of standard exemptions. See also Gibson, supra note 32 at 688-98 (outlining
the exemptions to statutes that have authority over hedge funds).
59. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
60. See Gibson, supra note 32, at 688 (noting that hedge funds structure themselves
around the major securities laws).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2000) [hereinafter Securities Act].
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000) [hereinafter Exchange Act].
63. 15 U.S.C. § 80b (2000) [hereinafter Advisors Act].
64. 15 U.S.C. § 80a (2000) [hereinafter Investment Company Act].
65. See Gibson, supra note 32, at 688-99.
66. See Donaldson, supra note 31.
67. See Securities Act at § 77f.
68. See Securities Act at § 77j.
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Securities Act.6 9
Under the private placement exemption, registration can be
avoided by making a non-public offering. v Though there are a variety
of ways to make a securities offering "non-public," rule 506 of
Regulation D7 1 is the most common means by which hedge funds
qualify for the private placement exemption. v Rule 506 of Regulation
D is "a set of requirements promulgated by the Commission to govern
private offerings. 73 Rule 506 exempts issuers who sell securities only
to "accredited investors" without any form of "general solicitation or
advertising., 74 An accredited investor includes:
Individuals who have a net worth, or joint worth with
their spouse, above $1,000,000, or have income above
$200,000 in the last two years (or joint income with
their spouse above $300,000) and a reasonable
expectation of reaching the same income level in the
year of investment; or are directors, officers or general
partners of the hedge fund or its general partner; and
certain institutional investors, including: banks; savings
and loan associations; registered brokers, dealers and
investment companies; licensed small business
investment companies; corporations, partnerships,
limited liability companies and business trusts with
more than $5,000,000 in assets; and many, if not most,
employee benefit plans and trusts with more than
$5,000,000 in assets.7 5
69. See Gibson, supra note 32, at 689.
70. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 14. Non public offerings are defined as offerings
"to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves." SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119, 125-27 (1953). (noting that the definition of "public offering" has evolved over
time, and has come to limit hedge funds primarily to those who are considered sophisticated
investors).
71. 17 C.F.R. 230.506 (2004).
72. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 14. Rule 506 is not the only means by which the
private offering exemption can be utilized, but since it is an established safe harbor, it is the
most frequently utilized method. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 15.
75. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2004).
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The restriction on "general solicitation or advertisement" relies
on the traditional preexisting relationships between broker and offeree,
and specifically prohibits "advertisements, articles, notices or other
communications published in a newspaper, magazine or similar media,
cold mass mailings, broadcasts over television or radio, material
contained on a web site available to the public or an email message sent
to a large number of previously unknown persons" or any meeting or
seminar where persons are generally solicited to participate.76
Finally, Rule 506 requires reasonable assurance that the interests
sold will not be resold by the offeree to the general public.77 Resale is
not typically an issue for hedge funds, as they have no interest in seeing
their interests resold.78 Hedge fund interests are typically sold on the
condition that resale can only be done with express permission of the
fund manager.79
B. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires brokers and
dealers to register with the SEC.80  Hedge funds usually exempt
themselves from this provision by defining themselves as "traders" of
securities, rather than "dealers.,
81 Section 12(g)82 and Rule 12g- 183
require that an issuer having 500 holders of record of a class of equity
security and assets in excess of $10 million at the end of its most
recently ended fiscal year register the equity securities under the
Exchange Act.84  Most hedge funds avoid these registration
requirements by limiting the number of equity holders to 499
investors.




80. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000).
81. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 18.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78h (2000).
83. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2004).
84. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 18.
85. Id.
3252005]
326 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 9
C. The Investment Company Act of 1940
The Investment Company Act of 1940 requires investment
companies to register with the SEC.86 Hedge funds are exempt from
regulation under this Act under the exceptions in section 3(c)(1) or
section 3(c)(7).87 Under 3(c)(1), funds with fewer than 100 investors
are exempt from registration.88 Under 3(c)(7), hedge funds are exempt
from registration as an investment company if they sell only to
"qualified investors' 8 9  (investors with at least $5 million in
investments) 90 and if they do not make a public offering.91 Most
recently, hedge funds have relied on section 3(c)(7) to exempt
themselves from registration, as there is no limitation on the number of
"qualified investors" that can invest in a hedge fund before registration
becomes mandatory.92 By relying on section 3(c)(7), hedge funds are
limited in size only by the registration requirements of other acts.93
D. The Investment Advisors Act of 1940
The Investment Advisors Act of 1940 requires all investment
advisors with more than fifteen clients and assets over thirty million
dollars to register with the SEC.94 As part of their registration
requirements, advisors must file and keep current Form ADV95 with the
SEC.96 Form ADV requires advisors to disclose information about
business practices and disciplinary history to the SEC and to their
86. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a (2000).
87. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 11.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 80a3(c)(1) (2000).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 80a3(c)(7) (2000).
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a2(a)(51) (defining "qualified investor").
91. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 11.
92. Id.
93. Id. at notes 56-59 and accompanying text. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
requires registration of any investment company having 500 investors or more. Id. Thus,
hedge funds limit themselves to 499 investors. Id.
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2000). Advisors with less than twenty five million in assets
are not permitted to register with the SEC. Id. Advisors with between twenty five and thirty
million dollars under management are advised, but not required, to register with the SEC. Id.
Advisors with at least thirty million of assets under management are required to register
with the SEC. Id.
95. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203-1 (2004); see also 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-1 (2004); see also
17 C.F.R. § 279.1 (2004).
96. 17 C.F.R. § 279.1 (2004).
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investors.97 Registered advisors are also required to maintain certain
accounting standards and are subject to periodic examinations by the
SEC.9 8 Finally, registered advisors are required to maintain specific
fraud prevention safeguards. 99
Hedge fund advisors work around registration requirements by
treating each legal organization it advises as a single client. 00 Under
the small advisor exception, advisors that have had fewer than fifteen
clients during the preceding twelve months and do not represent
themselves to the public as an investment advisor, are exempt from
registration requirements.' Under the current interpretation of the Act,
advisors may count each individual "legal organizations" as a single
client. 102 An organization may therefore have hundreds of members but
only be treated as a single client for purposes of the Investment
Advisors Act.10 3 Thus, a hedge fund may advise up to fourteen legal
organizations, such as hedge funds, limited liability companies, or
limited liability partnerships, without having to register. 1°4 The Final
Rule hopes to close this loophole, by considering each member of the
legal organizations managed by investment advisors as a single client,
thereby greatly multiplying the number of clients of the hedge fund and
eliminating the availability of the small advisor exception.'
05
V. CAUSES FOR CONCERN WITHIN THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY
The growth of hedge fund popularity and presence in the
financial markets has come with some potentially harmful
ramifications. 10 6  The concerns can be separated into two related
categories: threats to the financial industry10 7 and threats to the
97. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203-1 (2004); see also 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-1(2004); see also
17 C.F.R. § 279.1 (2004).
98. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (2000).
99. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2000).
100. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 21.
101. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000).
102. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-l(b)(3) (2004).
103. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 22.
104. See id.
105. See Final Rule, supra note 8, at 72,070.
106. See infra notes 110-62 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
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investor.108 Though threats to the financial industry are compelling in
their own right, the SEC final rule is designed for consumer
protection. 09
A. Threats to the Finance Industry
History provides the best illustration of the potential threat
posed to the financial industry by hedge funds. In 1998, after providing
four years of unmatched returns, Long Term Capital Management
(LTCM), a hedge fund run by former Salomon Brothers partner John
Meriweather, lost billions with the crash of the Russian Ruble.°"0 At the
height of its problems, the fund had an enormously high leverage ratio
of roughly one hundred to one."' With investors pulling out, and no
way to pay back its lenders, LTCM threatened to shake up the world
economy if it went into default." 2 In collaboration with the SEC and
the Federal Reserve, major banks and investment companies pulled
together an infusion of capital to save the firm. 13 LTCM is an example
of absence of market discipline with a lack of federal reporting
requirements.' '4  Though LTCM did report to creditors and investors
related to their capital structure and other financial indicators of its
creditworthiness, it did not provide and was not required to provide the
essential data that would have set off the sirens of lending institutions." 5
LTCM is not entirely to blame, however, because the banks and
financial companies extended the enormous levels of credit without
108. See infra notes 127-62 and accompanying text.
109. See Final Rule, supra note 8, at 72,054.
110. See Jonathan H. Gatsik, Hedge Funds: The Ultimate Game of Liar's Poker, 35
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 591, 600-01 (2001).
111. Id, at 601. Before the problems caused by the crash of the Ruble, LTCM was still
inordinately highly leveraged. Id. at 599. It had about 7.5 billion in capital. td. With its
losses however, capital was reduced to about 1.7 billion, with around 100 billion in assets.
Id.
112. Id. The effects of 100 billion dollars in losses to the finance industry would have
been devastating to the world economy. Id.
113. Susan Beck, Saving Long-Term Capital on a Short Deadline, AMERICAN LAWYER,
Nov. 1998, at 28.
114. See Gibson, supra note 32, at 704, 707. The lack of market discipline allowed
LTCM to grow beyond its means. See id. at 707. The lack of reporting requirements
prevented any regulator from noticing the problem. See id. at 704.
115. Id. at 708. Had the creditors to LTCM known the degree to which LTCM had
leveraged their assets, customary credit lending practices would not likely have allowed
such loans to be made. Id.
[Vol. 9
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properly considering the risk.'1 6 The market had become so faithful in
LTCM, and LTCM so arrogant in its success, that no one realized the
potential for disaster." 7
LTCM illustrates the impact that hedge funds can have on the
market if they grow too large without prudent management. Despite
numerous hearings and investigations on the necessity of increased
regulation to prevent another LTCM disaster, no increased regulation
was ever enacted.
1 8
B. Threat to Consumers
There are a variety of threats to consumers posed by the hedge
fund industry." 9 The problems are well documented, 120 and the SEC
has identified a number of public policy concerns related to hedge
funds, including lack of SEC oversight,' 2' fraud, 22 recent growth, 23
valuation, 24 retailization,
25 disclosure, 26 and conflicts of interest.
27
The underlying focus of the current SEC action centers on consumer
116. Id.
117. See id. at714.
118. See Greupner, supra note 6, at 1556; see generally, Report of the President's
Working Group on Financial Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long
Term Capital Management 5 (Apr. 1999) available at http://www.ustreas.gov/
press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf. (on file with the North Carolina Banking Institute)
[hereinafter LTCM Report].
119. See infra notes 120-62 and accompanying text.
120. See generally Staff Report, supra note 50 at 76-87 (discussing the many concerns of
the SEC regarding hedge funds); see generally Press release, Securities and Exchange
Commission, SEC Chairman Donaldson Releases Staff Report on Hedge Funds (Sept. 29
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003- 125.htm. For the investigation, the
"SEC staff reviewed documents and information from 65 hedge fund advisors managing
more than 650 different hedge funds with over $160 billion of assets." Id. "Staff also visited
hedge fund advisors and prime brokers and conducted a series of examinations of registered
funds of hedge funds." Id. In addition, the staff met with a variety of hedge fund industry
experts and observers. Id. "The Commission also held a two-day Roundtable, during which
a variety of experts discussed key aspects of hedge fund operations." Id. "The staff also
analyzed approximately 80 comment letters that were received by the Commission on hedge
fund issues following the Roundtable." Id.
121. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 76.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 77.
124. See id. at 79-80.
125. See id. at 80-81.
126. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 83.
127. See id.
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protection concerns raised by the growth of the hedge fund industry.' 28
1. Oversight
The SEC cites two primary concerns related to the lack of hedge
fund oversight: an "inability to detect fraud and other misconduct at
early stages" and a "lack of meaningful information about hedge funds
and hedge fund advisors."'129 Both of these factors handicap the SEC in
protecting American consumers.
30
Of the thirty-eight enforcement actions instigated by the SEC
against hedge funds between 1998 and 2003, nearly all resulted from
investor or service provider reports to the SEC. 3 ' By the time the SEC
became involved most of the damage had been done. 132 By contrast, the
SEC claims that this type of fraud does not occur nearly as often with
registered advisors because they are subject to examinations by the
SEC. 133
The SEC has no idea how many hedge funds there are in the
United States, 134 how large an asset pool they control, 35 or who their
advisors are. 13 6  With the growth of hedge funds, especially to non-
128. See generally Registration Under the Advisors Act of Certain Hedge Fund
Advisors, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,172 (proposed July 28, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275
& 279) [hereinafter Proposed Rule]. In the introduction to the proposed rule, there is a
description of the information that helped lead up to the proposed rule's creation. Id. at
45174. The rule cites two major studies: the SEC staff report and the President's working
group in 1999. Id. The President's Working Group report focused primarily on risks to the
banking and finance industry from hedge funds inspired by the LTCM hedge fund debacle
in 1996. Id.
129. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 76.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 76 n.263. (statement of Stephen M. Cutler)
[I]n the case of unregistered advisors, [the Commission's Enforcement
Division is] not going to be the beneficiar[y] of an examination that is
going to have identified a problem, brought it to our attention in the
form of an enforcement referral. So a lot of what we end up seeing in
the hedge fund area is after the train wreck has already happened. We
will get a complaint from an investor that finds that he's been wiped out.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Stephen M. Cutler, Roundtable Transcript, May 15,
2002).
133. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 76.
134. See id. at 77.
135. See id.
136. See id.
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traditional investors such as pensions, and funds of hedge funds, 137 the
staff sees this lack of information regarding hedge funds as a significant
inhibitor to the SEC's ability to protect the investors.1
38
2. Hedge Fund Portfolio Securities Valuation
Another concern indicated by the staff is "the lack of
independent checks on a hedge fund advisor's valuation of a. . . fund's
portfolio securities.' ' 139 Hedge fund advisors are free to represent the
value of the securities in any way they choose, even if they have an
outside service provider confirm valuation.140 The SEC's lack of power




Retailization is the practice of making hedge funds available to
a more broad array of investors, specifically small investors with lower
incomes. 142 Though hedge funds have traditionally only been available
to "sophisticated investors," retailization attempts to open the market to
typical mom and pop investors. 143  The SEC Staff report of 2003
indicates that although the number of qualified investors has grown
significantly in the past fifteen years, there is no evidence of significant
numbers of retail investors entering the hedge fund market. 144 Despite
these findings, the staff committee expressed its concern that brokers
would begin to solicit newly minted investors as a source of new
investments for hedge funds. 145  In addition to small investors,
137. See infra notes 148-157
138. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 77-79.
139. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 79; see generally Christine Williamson, Hidden
Risk: Investors Skim Over Questions of Fund Valuation, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, July
12, 2004, at 19.
140. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 80. Unregistered hedge fund advisors are free to
use their discretion when deciding whether to override the valuation of their securities by an
outside service provider. Id.
141. Id.
142. Walter Updegrave, Hedge Your Bets?; Hedge funds are Opening Their Doors to
Investors Who Don't Have Millions to Invest, MONEY, Aug. 2003, at 61.
143. Weinberg, supra note 5, at 186.
144. See Staff Report, supra note 48, at 81.
145. Id.
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retailization fears have been spurred by institutional investors, such as
pension plan managers, universities, endowments, and charitable
organizations, that have shown an increased interest in hedge funds.
146
Such entities are an indirect means by which hedge funds can access
small investors. 1
47
There is also a concern related to a relatively new investment
model commonly referred to as Registered Funds of Hedge Funds
(FOHF), which makes hedge fund investment available to small
investors. 148  A FOHF invests in a variety of hedge funds within one
fund. 149  It is like a mutual fund, except that instead of investing in
individual securities, it invests in a variety of hedge funds. 5 ° Many
FOHFs have lower investment minimums than typical hedge funds,
which opens them up to small investors.'' They also tend to cost the
investor much more in fees than a normal hedge fund. 152 Though funds
of hedge funds register with the SEC, the information FOHFs receive
from unregistered hedge funds is not always reliable.1
5 3
The SEC staff's concern with FOHFs is the lack of reliable data
related to calculations of net asset value. 154 The staff is also concerned
that investors in FOHFs will not be adequately informed as to the fees
they will be charged by hedge funds within the fund. 155 Finally, the lack
146. Lewis Knox, The Hedge Fund: Institutional Money is Swelling the Coffers of the
World's Largest Hedge Fund Managers, 28 INST. INVESTOR (International Edition) July 1,
2003, at 53; see also Christine Williamson, Allocation Decision: Hedge Funds Riskier for
Smaller Non-Profits, Study Says, 43 PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, Sept. 20, 2004, at 43.
147. See Staff Report, supra note 48, at 82.
148. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, HEDGING YOUR BETS: A HEADS UP ON
HEDGE FUNDS AND FUNDS OF HEDGE FUNDS, at http://sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm (last
visited Jan. 5, 2005).
149. Id.
150. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 67.
151. See Weinberg, supra note 143, at 186.
152. See id. Hedge funds often come with a very high service fee. Id. It can take the
form of a set percentage of fund profits, and upfront fee, or both. Id. In a fund of a hedge
fund, the fund carries a similar fee, in addition to the fees of all hedge funds that are
invested in. Id. Thus, the investor is hit with a proverbial double whammy. Id.
153. See Williamson, supra note 131, at 19. The bull market for hedge funds has caused
some advisors to funds of hedge funds to cut comers where possible and rely on shady
information regarding the valuation of the hedge funds they invest in and the security of
their investments. Id.
154. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 81.
155. See id. at 82.
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of transparency may jeopardize the desired diversification of a fund.'56
The bane of such oversight would fall on the investor.'57
4. Conflicts of Interest
The SEC has also expressed concern that hedge fund advisors
may have conflicts of interest between hedge fund and non-hedge fund
investors. 5 8 Though a conflict of interest is permissible, provided that
clients are notified of the conflict, the staff expressed concern that
notice was not taking place to a satisfactory level of specificity.
59
Hedge fund advisors usually have significant incentives to
maintain a successful hedge fund, such as the advisor's own personal
investment in the fund or the heightened fees that hedge funds
command. 160 Such incentives are a temptation for a manager to favor
the hedge fund over other clients or management responsibilities.'
61
Also, considering that different strategies are implemented for different
funds, such as short selling for hedge funds and long positions for
regular mutual funds, it is possible that a decision to benefit one client
will come at the expense of another.
62
These concerns illustrate the threat that hedge funds can have to
investment consumers and the financial industry in general. 63 Though
the final rule does not address all of these concerns, it is clear that hedge
funds are at least a potential threat to investors and the finance industry
as a whole. 64
156. See id. Investors may invest in a FOHF, as well as other mutual funds or FOHF,
and have a redundant or duplicated investments. Id. For example, two hedge funds could
invest in the same securities, or utilize the same investment model. Id. If an investor invests
in both of them, the investment would be redundant. Id. Since disclosure is not required by
hedge funds, the investor would have no idea that his attempt to diversify was failing. Id.
157. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 81.
158. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 83.
159. See id.
160. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 84; See also Anne Tergesen, Time to Hedge on
Hedge Funds? New Research Shows that Returns are Sliding, and Some don't Help you
Diversify, Bus. WK., Sept. 13, 2004, at 105. "A hedge fund investor can expect to fork over
1% to 2% of the account balance every year to cover management fees... [In addition,]
hedge funds typically pocket about 20% of any profits they generate." Id.
161. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 84.
162. See id.
163. See supra notes 119-62 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 119-62 and accompanying text.
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VI. FINAL RULE ANALYSIS
Guided by the 1999 President's Report, 65 the SEC staff
report, 66 and a roundtable of industry professionals,167 on December 10,
2004, the SEC issued the final rule to address the concerns of hedge
fund growth.
168
A. Justification for the Rule
The SEC cites three factors that guide the rule: 69 growth of the
hedge fund industry, 70 concern over the increased instances of fraud, 
71
and "retailization" of hedge funds that has occurred through funds of
hedge funds.
17 2
B. Purpose of the Rule
With the new rule, the SEC hopes to accomplish five goals.
73
First, the SEC hopes to obtain an accurate count of the number, size and
structure of nearly all hedge funds on the market. 174 Second, the SEC
hopes that registration will prevent fraud by catching it before it occurs,
165. See LTCM Report, supra note 118.
166. See Staff Report, supra note 48.
167. See Proposed Rule, supra note 128, at 45,174. On May 14th and 15th of 2003, the
SEC held roundtable discussions on issues related to hedge funds. Id. The group covered a
variety of topics, including (1) the structure, operation and compliance activities of hedge
funds; (2) marketing issues; (3) investor protection issues; (4) the current regulatory scheme;
and (5) whether additional regulation is warranted. Id. Participants in the roundtable
discussion included David Vaughn, a partner with Dechert, Mark Yusko, Former President
of UNC Management Company, Robert Steele, Vice Chairman of Goldman Sachs, Robert
Pozen of Harvard Law School and a variety of industry leaders from all over the world of
finance. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Panelists Set for SEC Hedge
Fund Roundtable (May 7, 2003) available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-60.htm.
168. See Final Rule, supra note 8.
169. See Final Rule, supra note 7, at 72,055-57.
170. See id. at 72,056.
171. See id. at 72,057.
172. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 69, 82. The SEC notes that many hedge funds
have begun to lower their minimum investment requirements, that funds of hedge funds
have made hedge funds more available to retail investors, and that public and private
pension funds, universities and charitable foundations have entered the hedge fund market.
Id.
173. See Proposed Rule, supra note 128, at 45,178-80
174. Id. at45,178.
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and deterring potential defrauders. 75 Third, the SEC hopes registration
will prevent unqualified persons from using the unregulated status of
hedge funds as a cover to commit fraud. 176 Fourth, registration would
require adoption of compliance controls in an effort to prevent conflicts
of interest. 177 Finally, the SEC believes registration would help to place
a limit on retailization, because the Advisors Act requires direct
investors to have a net worth of at least $1.5 million or $750,000 for the
advisor to charge performance fees.
178
C. Force and Substance of the Rule
The final rule will have three effects. First, it redefines who
must register under the Advisors Act, and functions to include nearly all
hedge fund advisors. 79  Second, the new rule provides exceptions to
registration for certain types of investment advisors. 180 Finally, the rule
175. Id.
176. See id. at 45,179-80; see e.g., SEC v. Ryan J. Fontaine and Simpleton Holdings
Corporation a/k/a Signature Investments Hedge Fund Litigation Release No. 18,254 (July
28, 2003) (charging Fontaine and Signature with violating Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule
lOb-5 thereunder, and Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940;
and charges Signature with violating Section 7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940). In
November 2002, the SEC charged Ryan J. Fontaine, a twenty-two year old college student
living with his parents in Bloomfield Hills, Michigan with fraud. Id. Using the Internet to
mask himself as a reputable hedge fund advisor, Fontaine fabricated an unregistered
investment group, "Simpleton Holdings Company" also known as "Signature Investments
Hedge Fund," and conducted an unregistered stock issuance. Id. Through false statements
about the fund's track record, financial backing, assets under management, accounting, and
relationship with reputable financial institutions and investors, Fontaine secured investments
totaling nearly $30,000 from two investors in only four months. Id. From a period from July
2002 and at least October 22, 2002, Fontaine and Signature deceived investors into
investing in Signature by fraudulently claiming, among other things, that: (a) Signature
"averaged over a 39.5% annual return" over its 13-year history, including returns "during
the bear market of the past 2 years [of ] over 21% per year;" (b) Signature had
approximately $250 million under management; (c) Salomon Smith Barney was the sub-
advisor to Signature; and (d) KPMG, LLP performed certain auditing services for Signature.
Id. The defendants also made false and misleading statements about various investment
advisory services purportedly offered by Signature, such as a Roth IRA program and a
401(k) program. Id. All such statements were false; signature was literally a one-person
shop with no financial backing from other investors, no relationship with Salomon Smith
Barney, and no relationship with KPMG. Id. All representations as to the fund's
performance were fabricated, as the fund itself had no investment history whatsoever. Id.
177. See Proposed Rule, supra note 128, at 45,180.
178. See Final Rule, supra note 7, at 72,064.
179. See infra notes 182-203 and accompanying text.
180. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
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defines what types of procedures must be followed to be properly
"registered" with the SEC.18 1
1. New Classes of Registrants
The primary force of the final rule would be to require nearly all
"private fund"'182 advisors to register with the SEC under the Advisors
Act of 1940.183 The rule creates this heightened registration requirement
by reinterpreting the word "client" within the context of the "Small
Advisor Exception" to the Advisors Act.
184
Though the Small Advisor Exception would seem to limit hedge
funds to fourteen investors, the exception as it is currently interpreted is
practically worthless to limit the size of a hedge fund.1 81 Under the
exception, advisors are permitted to treat each individual hedge fund
under management as a single client. 86 The final rule seeks to close
this loophole by adding a new provision to section 203b(3) of the rule,
which would
require investment advisors to count each owner of a
'private fund' as a client for purposes of determining the
availability of the private advisor exemption of section
203(b)(3) of the Act. As a result, an advisor to a
'private fund'.... could no longer rely on the private
advisor exemption if the advisor, during the course of
181. See infra notes 204-10 and accompanying text.
182. See Final Rule, supra note 7, at 72,073. "Private Fund" is a company that would be
defined as and investment company under 3a of the investment company act of 1940 (15
U.S.C. 80a-3(a)), but for exceptions provided in either 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the act, that
permits its owners to redeem their interest within two years of purchase, the interests of
which have been offered on the basis of the expertise of the investment advisor. Id.
183. See Final Rule, supra note 7, at 72,054.
184. Id. The "Small Advisor Exception," contained in section 203(b)(3)-1 exempts from
registration investment advisors who have had fewer than fifteen clients over the past twelve
months. 15 U.S.C. 80b-3 (2004) (listing investment advisors exempt from registration).
The provision provides five exceptions from the registration requirement, though Section
80b-3(b)(3) is the only section relevant to the proposed rule. Id. It defines the Small
Investor Exception requirements. Id.
185. See infra notes 186-88. The only real limitation to the number of clients in a hedge
fund comes from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See supra note 85 and
accompanying text.
186. See Gatsik, supra note 110, at 607. Under the current rule, hedge funds can have up
to 499 members and still be counted as one client under the Small Advisor Exception. Id.
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the preceding twelve months, advised a private fund that
had more than fourteen investors.
187
Thus, advisors to private funds would be required to "look
through" each fund under management and count all investors as
individual clients. 188 The new rule also contains a special provision
89
regarding hedge funds to which registered funds, including FOHFs,
invest.' 90 The provision requires advisors to "look through" each fund
that the advisor serves, and count each investor in the FOHF as an
individual client.' 91 As a result of the Final Rule, unless they qualify for
one of the exceptions, 192 most hedge fund advisors will be forced to
register with the SEC.
193
2. Exceptions to the Rule: Exemptions from Registration
Under the Final rule, two entities are exempt from the proposed
registration requirements. 194 The SEC does not seek to include certain
long term investment structures, such as private equity funds and
venture capital funds. '9' As such, the SEC exempts from registration
any fund that has a lock up period over two years. 196 Additionally, even
though overseas advisors are included in the registration rule, such
advisors who manage publicly offered funds overseas would not be
required to register under the act, "provided they are regulated as a
public investment company by the laws of a country other than the
187. See Proposed Rule, supra note 128, at 45,182.
188. See id.




192. See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
193. See Final Rule, supra note 7, at 72,070.
194. See id. at 72,071-75.
195. See Proposed Rule, supra note 128, at 45,185. A lock up period is basically the
period of time during which an investor cannot access his or her investment without
receiving a significant penalty. Joy Ferguson, Lock-up Periods May Grow Longer for
Hedge Funds, BANK LOAN REPORT, Nov. 22, 2004. Most funds require a lockup period of at
least one year. Id.
196. See Final Rule, supra note 7, at 72,074.
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United States," and their offices and primary place of business are
overseas. 
197
C. Registration Requirements and Procedures as Outlined in the
Final Rule
In addition to establishing the new requirements for who must
register with the SEC, 198 the rule has some effect on the way in which
funds have to charge their clients, keep accounting records, and come
into compliance under the Advisors Act of 1940.'99
Under the final rule, advisors will not be able to charge their
clients performance fees 200 unless certain requirements are met.
20 1
Under the Advisors Act, registered advisors are only allowed to charge
performance fees to "qualified clients. 20 2 This requirement effectively
197. See id. at 72072 (explaining section 203(b)(3)-l(d)(3)). For private foreign hedge
fund advisors, however, the rule applies as it would to domestic private advisors. Id. There
has been some question as to whether direct regulation of hedge funds such as this one
would drive advisors overseas. See Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs., 105 th Cong. 37 (1998) (statements of Alan Greenspan,
Chairman of the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, discussing the implications
of hedge fund regulation).
Does the fact that investors have lost most of their capital and creditors
may take some losses on their exposure to LTCM call for direct
regulation of hedge funds? It is questionable whether hedge funds can
be effectively directly regulated in the United States alone .... Hedge
funds' physical presence is small. Given the amazing communication
capabilities available virtually around the globe, trades can be initiated
from almost any location. Indeed, most hedge funds are only a short
step from cyberspace. Any direct U.S. regulations restricting their
flexibility will doubtless induce more aggressive funds to emigrate from
under our jurisdiction. The best we can do, in my judgment, is what we
do today: Regulate them indirectly.. .We are thus able to monitor far
better hedge funds' activity, especially as they influence U.S. financial
markets. If the funds move abroad, our oversight will diminish. Id.
198. See supra, notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
199. See infra, notes 193-210 and accompanying text.
200. Anne Tergesen, Time to Hedge on Hedge Funds? New Research Shows that
Returns are Sliding, and Some don't Help you Diversify, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 13, 2004, at
105. Performance fees are fees collected by the advisor based on the performance of the
fund. They can be structured in a variety of ways, including such that investors only collect
off of profits above a certain percentage. Though high performance fees are atypical with
other types of funds such as mutual funds, hedge funds usually charge up to 20% on any
profits generated by the fund. Id.
201. 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3 (2004).
202. See Final Rule supra note 8, at 72,076 and accompanying text. "Rule 205-3(a) and
(b). Rule 205-3 permits registered advisors to charge performance fees that would otherwise
be prohibited by section 205(a). [15 U.S.C. 80b-5(b)(4)]. To be a qualified client, the
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raises the bar regarding the minimum net worth necessary to invest in
hedge funds.20 3
An obvious effect of the final rule is that registrants will be
required to come into compliance with all of the accounting, disclosure,
and procedural requirements of the Advisors Act of 1940.204  This
includes submitting a Form ADV,205 complying with Rule 204-2 record-
keeping procedures,2 °6 on-site inspections of books and records,20 7
designation of a chief compliance officer,20 8 and development of
comprehensive compliance procedures.2°  Ideally, these requirements
would provide the SEC with some oversight regarding hedge fund
activity, and "protect the nation's securities markets. 2 0
investor generally must have a net worth of 1.5 million dollars or place 750,000 dollars
under the advisor's" control. See id.
A 'qualified client' under rule 204-3 is: (i) A natural person who or a
company that immediately after entering into the contract has at least
$750,000 under the management of the investment advisor; (ii) A
natural person who or a company that the investment advisor entering
into the contract (and any person acting on his behalf) reasonably
believes, immediately prior to entering into the contract, either: (A) Has
a net worth (together, in the case of a natural person, with assets held
jointly with a spouse) or more than $1,500,000 at the time the contract is
entered into; or (B) Is a qualified purchaser as defined in section
2(a)(51)(A) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-
2(a)(51)(A)) at the time the contract is entered into; or (iii) A natural
person who immediately prior to entering into the contract is: (A) An
executive officer, director, trustee, general partner, or person serving in
a similar capacity, of the investment advisor; or (B) An employee of the
investment advisor (other than an employee performing solely clerical,
secretarial or administrative functions with regard to the investment
advisor) who, in connection with his or her regular functions or duties,
participates in the investment activities of such investment advisor,
provided that such employee has been performing such functions and
duties for or on behalf of the investment advisor, or substantially similar
functions or duties for or on behalf of another company for at least 12
months." Id.
203. See Proposed Rule, supra note 128, at 45,186.
204. See Final Rule, supra note 7, at 72,054.
205. 17 C.F.R. § 279.1 (2004).
206. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2 (2004).
207. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (2002).
208. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7 (2002).
209. Id.
210. See supra note 8, at 72,054.
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VII. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RULE AND INDUSTRY REACTION
Despite the call from industry experts to extend the deadline, the
comment period for the proposed rule expired on September 15,
2004.21 Those in favor of the rule agree with the SEC that hedge funds
have grown too large and are long overdue for regulation.212 More
interesting, however, are the comments in opposition to the proposed
regulation. 2 3 Among the comments in opposition to the rule are some
relatively loud voices within the financial world, including Cynthia
Glassman, 214 Paul Atkins, 2 5 and Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan
Greenspan.1 6 Those who disagree with the rule present a slew of
compelling argument as to why hedge fund regulation is impractical,
ineffective, and irrational. 1 7
A. Dissent of Commissioners Cynthia Glassman and Paul Atkins
Commissioners Cynthia Glassman and Paul Atkins wrote a joint
dissent to the Final Rule. 2 8  The dissent acknowledges the fact that
there is information the SEC could use to help understand the hedge
fund industry, 219 but notes the final rule would not provide all the
necessary information while imposing an unnecessary cost to both the
agency and the industry.220 Citing the 2003 Staff report, the dissent
argues the increased instances of fraud have been insignificant,
"retailization" has not occurred, the final rule is an unnecessary waste of
211. Christopher Faille, Comment Period Ends: Leaving Something for Everybody (Sept.
2004) available at http://www.hedgeworld.com/news/read-news.cgi?section=dail&story=
dail I 1142.html&search terms=faille.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See Proposed Rule, supra note 128, at 45,198.
215. See id.
216. See Eric Schurenberg, Put More Cops on the Street; The SEC chief won a split vote
to head off potential problems with hedge funds. More power to him, MONEY, Dec. 2004, at
22. Greenspan has publicly expressed his concern regarding hedge fund regulation. Id.
217. See infra notes 218-57 and accompanying text.
218. See Final Rule, supra note 8, at 72,089. The dissent is especially rare, as there have
only been 16 splits of opinion out of 1,606 agency votes since William Donaldson took
office as SEC Chairman. Carrie Johnson, Independent Chairmen Required for Funds: SEC
Aims to Eliminate Conflicts of Interest, WASH. POST, June 24, 2004, at E04.
219. See Final Rule, supra note 8, at 72,089.
220. See id. (dissenting opinions of Commissioners Cynthia A. Glassman and Paul S.
Atkins).
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time and resources, and even if the rule is an effective means of
enforcement, loopholes in the rule are too wide to make the rule
effective.221
The dissenters argue that the instances of fraud within the hedge
fund industry are mild in comparison to the total number of cases
brought by the SEC each year.222  By the SEC's own admission, the
instances of fraud within the hedge fund market are disproportionately
low to the instances of fraud within the investment industry generally.223
Of fraud actions that have been brought against hedge funds, the
majority would not have been prevented had the advisors to those funds
been registered with the SEC.2 24 In the past five years, the SEC has
only brought forty-six fraud actions against hedge fund managers. 221 Of
those forty-six, only a small number could have been prevented by
registration. 6  Add to these minor instances of fraud the fact that the
vast majority of hedge fund investors are sophisticated or institutional
22728investors, and one may ask why SEC oversight is necessary at all.228
Furthermore, the dissenters believe that the final rule will not scare
221. See id.
222. See id. at 72,090.
223. See Donaldson, supra note 31. Chairman Donaldson states, "I have no reason to
believe that fraud is more prevalent in hedge funds than it is anywhere else." Id.
224. See Final Rule, supra note 8, at 72,092.
The 46 cases suggest that the typical 'hedge fund' fraud is perpetrated
by an advisor that is too small to be registered with the Commission,
was registered already with the Commission, or evaded registration
requirements. Specifically, eight of these forty-six cases involve hedge
fund advisors who were already registered with the Commission. In five
of the forty-six cases, the fund should have been registered under the
Investment Company Act, so their advisors already should have been
registered under current rules. In twenty of the forty-six cases, the hedge
funds were too small to be covered by the proposed rulemaking. In two
cases, the fraud involved a principal of a registered broker-dealer or
investment advisor, over whom we [the SEC] already had full
regulatory oversight. Three of the forty-six cases were garden-variety
fraud designed to swindle investors, regardless of whether the vehicles
were called hedge funds, venture capital funds, limited partnerships or
prime banks. Registration might have deterred them from using the term
'hedge fund,' but would not have deterred the fraud itself. In only eight
of the forty-six cases the existence of the rule might have increased in
the Commission's oversight.
Proposed Rule, supra note 128, at 45197.
225. See Final Rule supra note 8, at 72,092.
226. See id.
227. See Lowenstein, supra note 30, at 25.
228. See Final Rule, supra note 8, at 72,092.
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advisors into conforming.2 29  Though the threat of inspection would
loom over the industry, the SEC does not have the resources to inspect a
significant number of hedge funds.23°
The dissent also dismisses the retailization concerns of the
majority. 31 If unsophisticated investors are not currently investing in
hedge funds,232 and hedge fund managers are not currently marketing or
seeking out unsophisticated investors, 3  then the final rule is
anticipatory and currently unnecessary.234  The dissent acknowledged
the increasing number of qualified investors within the marketplace, but
calls for adjusting the eligibility criteria rather than forcing advisors to
* 235register.
The exception to the rule for funds with a lock up of two years
or longer is also questioned by the dissent.236 Under the rule, funds or
investment entities that hold their investors' money for longer than two
years are exempt from registration. 237  The dissent questions whether
this two-year provision would only cause hedge fund advisors to require
a two-year redemption period and thus remain exempt from the rule.238
Though the SEC's rationale for the exemption may be well founded, the
two-year lock up period exception may act as a loophole, and ruin
whatever effectiveness the final rule would have on preventing fraud or
gathering information on the market.239  Hedge funds may simply
change their investment requirements to fit within the exemptions. 40
The SEC acknowledges that hedge funds typically have a mandatory
lock-up period, in which investors may not withdraw funds without
significant penalties. 241  The lock-up period for most hedge funds is
229. See Proposed Rule, supra note 128, at 72,093.
230. See Daniel Strachman, Hedge Funds Ruled: How the New Regulations Will Affect
Brokers-and Why Clients May Not Receive the Benefits Regulators are Promising, ON
WALL STREET, Oct. 1, 2004. "It is clear that the commission does not have enough
resources to police the areas they are currently responsible for policing." Id.
231. See Final Rule, supra note 8, at 72,096.
232. See Weinberg, supra note 5, at 186.
233. See Staff Report, supra note 50, at 80.
234. See Final Rule, supra note 8, at 72,093.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 72,096.
237. See id.
238. See id.





usually no more than one year, and it is questionable as to whether
providing an exemption for funds that have a two year lock up period
would only encourage hedge funds to adopt a similar lockup. 42 Would
hedge fund investors demand liquidity to the point where they would
not invest in a fund that froze access to their money for 
two years? 243
The Final Rule fails to properly address this issue.2"
There is also the concern that the registration of hedge funds,
assuming the final rule would be successful in compelling registration,
would put an unwarranted stamp of approval on hedge funds without
actually confirming their worthiness. 245 The approval associated with
successful registration, however, could be seen as a false green light for
investors to take the plunge into hedge fund investment.246 Small
investors who may have heeded the warnings of the SEC and others in
the past to avoid hedge funds, may erroneously see the SEC registration
as an indication of new safety standards within the industry.247
Finally, the dissenters cite the added cost of the proposed
regulation both to the agency and to the hedge fund industry.248 With
the increased costs of enforcing registration, the SEC would have to
take time and money away from its other duties, while investors would
lose returns. 249 This objection is well taken, as the SEC's resources may
already be spread too thin in its ability to regulate its current
oversight.250  Adding hedge funds to the docket may have a high
opportunity cost; the brunt of which would be felt by efforts to deter
fraud within other investment entities such as mutual funds.251
B. Legality of the Final Rule
Some believe that the final rule is illegal, and that the SEC is
242. Id.
243. Id.





249. See Final Rule, supra note 8, at 72,094.
250. See Michael Schroeder, SEC Gets a Raise, but Will it Be Enough?, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 12, 2002, at C 1.
251. See Final Rule, supra note 8, at 72,094.
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powerless to require hedge funds to register under the Advisors Act of
1940.52 Comments to the SEC have suggested that counting clients
with the look through provision runs contrary to the Advisors act, and is
thus outside the authority of the SEC.253 The crux of the argument is
based on the rule established in Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., that Congress' use of the word
"client" in the Advisors Act is unambiguous, and therefore not subject
to agency interpretation. 4 Such an argument is compelling, though the
Final Rule aptly addresses this issue by pointing out that the word
"client" is not defined in the Advisors Act, and that the first hedge fund
did not exist until after the Advisors Act was created.255 Even with
evidence suggesting Congress did speak directly to the definition of
"client, 256 any ambiguity may be enough to stifle such an argument.25 7
VIII. CONCLUSION
Based on the objections proposed by dissenters Glassman and
Atkins,2 58 as well as the objections submitted during the comment
period,259 compelling arguments can be made in opposition to the
rule.260 Despite these objections, the SEC's final rule to require
252. Deborah Brewster, Lawyers Question SEC's Legal Authority, FIN. TIMES (London),
Sept. 10' 2004, at 24. See generally Memorandum from Marianne K. Smythe, Louis R.
Cohen & James E. Anderson, Partners, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, to Jonathan
G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Sept. 8, 2004) [hereinafter
Smythe] (discussing the legal authority of the SEC to enforce the final rule).
253. See Final Rule, supra note 8, at 72069.
254. See generally, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984). The Supreme Court held that where Congress directly addresses an
issue within the statute in question, the administrative agency must follow the direction of
the statute. Id. The court may utilize the "traditional" tools available, such as legislative
history and the language of the statute itself. Id.
255. See Final Rule, supra note 7, at 72,069.
256. See Smythe, supra note 252. Smyth and her colleagues cite numerous authorities
supporting the notion that the word "client" has been directly addressed by congress. Id.
Such references include Black's Law Dictionary, Commission reports which inspired the
Advisors Act, the Supreme Court holding in SEC v. Lowe, the very structure of the Advisors
Act, the 1970 amendment to the Advisors Act, and past SEC interpretation of the word. Id.
257. See Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43.
258. See supra notes 218-51 and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., Comment Letter of Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP (Sept. 14, 2004);
Comment Letter of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (Sept. 15,
2004); Comment Letter of International Swaps and Derivatives Association (Sept. 15,
2004).
260. See supra notes 218-57 and accompanying text.
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registration under the Advisors Act of 1940 is a necessary step in the
right direction. The rapid growth of the industry, both in size and
diversity of clients calls for some degree of regulation. 26' Though there
is no current retailization to small investors within the hedge fund
industry, there is no question that hedge funds are among the hottest
investment conduits on the market today.2 62 The increased popularity of
hedge funds may not qualify as "retailization," but there is no denying
that hedge funds have a huge stake in the market and should be
respected as such.263 Unfortunately, the remedy proposed by the SEC is
inadequate to address these concerns. The final rule is as easily avoided
as any of the other four statutes that require registration.26  As the
dissenters to the final rule point out, exceptions to the rule would make
it easily avoided and thus ineffective.265 Even those who agree to fall
under the new rule and submit to registration will not be effectively
monitored, as the SEC does not have the resources to oversee so many
funds.26 6 The SEC should reexamine its approach to hedge fund
regulation, and adopt a more stringent registration requirement or none
at all. In the end, it is better in this instance to have more regulation
than not, though the effectiveness of the present rule is questionable.
JOSEPH HELLRUNG
261. See generally Lenzer, supra note 11.
262. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
263. Mukul Munish, To Steal the Show: Poll, THE STANDARD, July 12, 2004.
264. See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 236-44 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 248-51 and accompanying text.
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